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Abstract
This paper reports the findings of a survey of more than 3,000 firms in 20 transition
countries. It shows that barter and other non-monetary transactions (including the use of
bills of exchange, debt swaps, barter chains, and the redemption of debt in goods) are an
important phenomenon in Russia and Ukraine. Contrary to what is commonly believed
they are not negligible in Central and Eastern Europe. The causes and consequences vary
significantly between countries, but several conclusions emerge strongly. First, barter and
other non-monetary transactions are associated in all countries with financing difficulties
for firms. They appear to be helping to assure liquidity in an environment in which
contract enforcement (including tax enforcement) is uncertain. Secondly, the use of these
mechanisms is not significantly related to the restructuring and performance of firms that
use them in most countries except Russia. Thirdly, in Russia the nature of non-monetary
transacting is importantly different from elsewhere. It is much more associated than
elsewhere with market power and limited trading networks. It is also more costly in terms
of restructuring and performance. Firms that barter are less likely to improve their
existing products, probably because barter enables them to dispose of otherwise
unsaleable goods. They are also more likely to engage in internal reorganisation of a kind
designed purely to service existing barter chains. Internal reorganisation is strongly
associated with improved performance for firms that do not barter, but is unrelated to
performance for firms that do. Overall, in Russia but not elsewhere the findings are
consistent with the hypothesis that economic disorganisation, in the sense of Blanchard &
Kremer (1997), means that barter and other non-monetary transactions are both more
likely to occur and more damaging when they do occur.
1 Forthcoming in Paul Seabright (ed): The Vanishing Rouble: Barter networks and non-monetary
transactions in former Soviet societies, Cambridge University Press. The views in this paper are solely
those of the authors and not necessarily those of the EBRD or other institutions with which they are
affiliated.1
1. Introduction
The persistence of barter transactions over a number of years in complex
industrialised economies has been one of the most puzzling paradoxes of the transition
from central planning to market organisation. Historically barter has characterised
relatively simple societies with a comparatively undifferentiated division of labour. It has
also been observed in more complex societies in the aftermath of serious crises such as
wars. For example, complex chains of bilateral exchanges of goods between firms and
payment in kind to workers were prevalent in the western zones of post-war Germany
between 1945 and mid-1948. In the context of a high level of uncertainty about the future
of the economy, with the collapse of the Nazi command economy, the freezing of prices
and wages at their 1936 levels and extensive controls over interregional trade, there was
an extreme shortage of goods. An assessment at the time captured the essential role of
barter in this episode: “Where neither trading for money nor redistribution of goods by
political authority, alone or in combination, can ensure a reliable division of labour,
bilateral exchange seems to be the safest line of economic retreat” (Mendershausen 1949,
pp. 657-8). The improved functioning of the costly and cumbersome barter mechanism
enabled production to recover from less than 20% of the 1936 level in mid 1945 to 50%
by the end of 1947.
But whenever barter has been observed in such situations of crisis it has been short-
lived. In mid 1948, there was a currency reform combined with the lifting of price and
wage controls. Barter and side-payments in kind vanished. There was also a clear shift in
the nature of recovery to a dynamic process of growth vividly displayed in the jump in
investment, the radical reorganisation of production processes and the introduction of
new products (Carlin 1989). By the time of the currency reform, it was clear that recovery
was to be encouraged, a market economy was to be restored and that private ownership of
firms would remain largely intact. The episode of large-scale barter was ended abruptly
by the introduction of functional money and price and wage liberalisation. The “normal”
incentives of a market economy took over.
This episode raises the question why barter has persisted and indeed expanded in
transition economies after prices were liberalised, and why it has continued even in the
context of reasonable macroeconomic stability. Presumably other characteristics of
transition economies have interfered with the rapid establishment of “normal” market
economy incentives and practices. Marin and Schnitzer’s (1999) analysis suggests that a
key differentiating characteristic may be that the nature of the output collapse in post-war
Germany and in the transition countries was different.
The degree of “disorganisation” in terms of the disjunction between the relationships
of suppliers and purchasers of inputs in the planned economy and those sustainable in a
market economy appears to have been much greater in the transition economies than in
post-war Germany. The pattern of trades in postwar Germany seems to have been
motivated by producers trying to maintain supplier and customer relationships (Stamp
1947). In transition economies major changes in supplier/customer relationships were
required. When planning collapses and leaves behind bilateral monopoly relationships2
between input suppliers and purchasers, there is great scope for “hold-up” problems and
stalemates. As a result, production chains collapse (Blanchard & Kremer 1997). The
collapse is greater where new entrants and foreign suppliers are unable to play a
substantial role.
Marin & Schnitzer argue that trade credit expands in transition economies to help
offset the bargaining power of the input supplier. However, in the context of uncertain
contract enforcement trade credit is highly risky. Barter may therefore help the process of
output recovery by allowing trade credit to be collateralised in the form of the borrower’s
own output. This will allow output to be maintained in a world of disorganisation, though
it may have other more long-term costs. Normally these costs include the fact that firms
find themselves having to accept and re-sell products in the trading of which they have no
comparative advantage. But this particular cost may be lower when - as a symptom and
by-product of disorganisation - trading networks are limited and firms operate in
informational “islands” (Seabright, 1999); trading partners may be able to pool search
costs without sacrificing comparative advantage. In these conditions barter may have
fewer drawbacks than other responses to the problem of limited creditworthiness.
In post-war Germany output recovery in a barter-dominated economy before the
currency reform was often seen as remarkable (Abelshauser 1975). It is nevertheless very
clear that only when the functioning of market processes was fully restored did dynamic
future-oriented restructuring take place.
In understanding the prevalence of this expansion of barter in transition countries and
particularly in Russia, Ukraine and other CIS countries, it is important to bear in mind
that what is commonly referred to as “barter” in the Russian and Western literature on
these countries is not “barter” as conventionally defined. The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics, for example, defines barter as “a simultaneous exchange of commodities …
without using money. It is thus a form of trade in which credit is absent or weak….”
(Hart 1987). The Russian term barter, however, encompasses not only the exchange of
goods for goods, but also the exchange of goods for debt. If, for example, a firm pays for
a purchase of inputs with a bill of exchange (Russian veksel, from German Wechsel), then
this is barter (Russian), but it is certainly not barter as conventionally defined in the
English-language economics dictionaries. Indeed, Commander & Mummsen (1999)
show that most of what Russian firms refer to as barter is not in fact what economists
would term barter, i.e., the exchange of goods for goods; it is rather payment for goods
using non-monetary methods and instruments, i.e., debt.
There is, however, an important difference between the use of bills of exchange and
other debt instruments in capitalist economies and the countries of the CIS. When a bill
of exchange is redeemed in the CIS, typically the holder of the claim on the issuing firm
is not the customer that initially accepted the bill as payment. It is a different firm that has
purchased or otherwise acquired the bill (though precisely how often this occurs is
unclear). Furthermore, the bill of exchange may often be redeemed by the issuing firm
not in cash or equivalent, but in goods produced by the issuing firm. It is this last feature
that most clearly distinguishes the use of bills of exchange in CIS countries from the way3
they have been used in capitalist economies. The use of debt offsets in CIS countries, the
third main form of barter (along with bills of exchange and “barter” in the standard sense
of goods-for-goods) is conceptually similar. In the multilateral debt swaps observed in
CIS countries, by contrast, debts are essentially redeemed in goods, not cash. This is not
barter as conventionally defined, but it is a close cousin.
This paper analyses the transactions of firms conducted using non-monetary methods
and instruments: exchange of goods for goods, payment using bills of exchange, debt
swaps, redemption of debt in goods, etc. – “barter” as understood in the Russian sense of
the word.
2. Empirical findings
2.1 The nature of the survey
A large survey of enterprises in twenty transition countries was conducted in the early
summer of 1999 by the EBRD and the World Bank, and its provisional findings have
been published in the EBRD Transition Report 1999. The aim of the survey was to
investigate how enterprise restructuring behaviour and performance were related to
competitive pressure, the quality of the business environment, and the relationship
between enterprises and the state. The survey included approximately 125 firms from
each country, with the exceptions of Poland and Ukraine (over 200 firms) and Russia
(over 500 firms).
One question on barter was included: “What share of your firm’s sales are now (and
three years ago) conducted in barter, offsets or bills of exchange (money surrogates)?”
The six possible answers were one point (exactly zero) and five intervals of varying size
(1-10%, 11-25%, 26-50%, 51-75%, 76-100%). The econometric technique we use when
this is our dependent variable is interval regression (StataCorp, 1997). The advantage of
interval regression is that the coefficients on the exogenous variables can be interpreted
as if ordinary least squares were being applied to a continuous dependent variable; e.g.,
the coefficient on a dummy variable will give the impact in percentage points on the
share of barter.
Since only this question was asked, we have no way of checking if “barter, offsets
and bills of exchange (money surrogates)” were interpreted in the same way by different
firms and in different countries. There may be substantial cross-country differences of
interpretation (for instance whether trade credit is included in the definition). While this
places some limits on the interpretation of the findings from the survey, the breadth of
other information collected presents an unparalleled opportunity for exploring the causes
and consequences of barter.
The full sample size was 3,125 firms. Sampling was random from the population of
firms in each country, with the exception of minimum quotas for state-owned firms and
large firms. We omitted from the analysis firms with missing information, leaving us with4
3,079 firms. The sample is dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises; almost
half the sampled firms employ fewer than 50 persons, and less than 10% employ more
than 500. Half the firms in the sample are newly established private firms, 10% were
privatised to insiders, 25% were privatised to outsiders, and 15% remain state-owned.
Firms in the industrial and service sectors are roughly equally represented, each
accounting for 40-45% of the sample, with agricultural firms making up the remainder
(14%). Most firms were located in either large cities or national capitals (30%) or in
medium-sized cities (32%), with the rest in towns and rural areas (38%). Out of the full
sample of 3,000-odd firms, only 12 failed to answer the question on their current use of
barter, a response rate of over 99.5%. The response rate for the use of barter three years
previously was significantly lower, at 85%.
For just under one-third of the firms in the survey, barter and non-monetary
transactions make up more than 10% of their “sales” and for nearly one-fifth of firms, it
accounts for over 25%. Barter is more prevalent in Russia and Ukraine than elsewhere:
just over one half of firms report using barter for 10% of their business transactions and
just over one-third conduct 25% of their business this way (see Table 1). Other studies of
barter and non-monetary transactions in Russia and Ukraine are in line with the order of
magnitude reported in the EBRD survey.
Here we explore the data in several stages. To begin with, we look at size, sectoral
and locational effects. Next, using these as controls, we then look at the extent to which
the level of barter and non-monetary transacting reported by firms is related to
ownership, to financing problems and arrears and to competition in the product market.
After looking for firm-level correlates of barter, we examine whether some country level
variables are relevant: inflation, a measure of the softness of the budget constraint and of
the quality of the business environment. Finally we examine the consequences of barter
and non-monetary transactions for firm restructuring and performance.
2.2 Where does barter happen?
Table 1 shows the distribution of reported levels of barter and non-monetary
transactions by country. Barter is widespread in Russia and Ukraine. Elsewhere in the
CIS its incidence varies greatly, with high levels in Belarus, Moldova and Kazakhstan
and very low levels in some other countries. More surprisingly, barter and non-monetary
transactions appear in the Central and Eastern European countries (where they have often
been assumed to be absent). While there are relatively small proportions of firms
reporting barter at the level of 25% of sales or more, barter is non-negligible except
perhaps in Hungary. Croatia and Slovenia look quite out of line with the other non-CIS
countries in terms of the proportion of firms reporting no involvement in barter. This
suggests that the question may have been interpreted differently in those countries from
elsewhere. In the rest of the non-CIS countries (Central, Eastern and South-Eastern
Europe plus the Baltic states), the proportion of firms reporting no barter transactions
ranges from 49% in Estonia to 90% in Hungary.5
Across all countries large firms are more likely to be engaged in barter than are small
ones. This suggests that there are economies of scale in barter and non-monetary
transactions (see Guriev & Ickes, 1999). However, as Table 2 shows, there are both
sectoral and country variations to this pattern. This table provides a method of comparing
the likelihood of a firm being involved in barter (to the extent of at least 25% of sales)
across countries, sectors and size class of firm. To illustrate the patterns in the data, we
show the predicted probability that barter and non-monetary transactions account for
more than 25% of sales for a small firm (with less than 50 workers) and for a large firm
(with more than 500 workers). For many countries there are not enough agricultural firms
in the sample to form the basis for predicted probabilities. In these cases, the results for
industry and services only are shown in the table.
Table 1. Percentage of firms in sample reporting each level of barter and non-monetary transactions,
by country
(EBRD enterprise survey, 1999)
Country Percentage of sales accounted for by
barter and non-monetary transactions
No. firms
None 1-9 10-25 26-50 51-75 76-100
Russia 28.4 19.1 16.8 15.3 12.6 7.8 524
Ukraine 28.6 21.4 16.1 11.6 11.2 11.2 224
Other CIS
Armenia 82.3 10.5 4.8 0.8 1.6 0 124
Azerbaijan 78.0 8.7 11.8 0.8 0 0.8 127
Belarus 32.8 30.4 21.6 8.8 5.6 0.8 125
Georgia 72.1 10.8 12.4 3.9 0.8 0 129
Kazakhstan 36.2 21.3 18.1 7.9 11.0 5.5 127
Kyrghistan 47.2 11.2 18.4 11.2 8.0 4.0 125
Moldova 23.2 16.8 16.0 20.8 16.0 7.2 125
Uzbekistan 68.0 8.0 10.4 7.2 3.2 3.2 125
Non CIS
Bulgaria 64.8 24.8 7.2 1.6 1.6 0 125
Croatia 9.5 18.2 23.0 23.0 19.8 6.3 126
Czech Rep. 74.8 17.0 5.2 3.0 0 0 135
Estonia 49.2 42.2 6.1 2.3 0 0 132
Hungary 89.8 8.6 1.6 0 0 0 128
Lithuania 75.7 17.1 4.5 2.7 0 0 111
Poland 65.8 21.6 8.1 3.6 0.9 0 222
Romania 72.8 10.4 8.8 4.0 0.8 3.2 125
Slovakia 56.6 13.2 7.8 3.9 3.9 14.7 129
Slovenia 13.6 40.8 26.4 15.2 3.2 0.8 125
From Table 2 the size and sectoral distribution of barter looks quite similar for
Russia and Ukraine. Firms in industry are more likely to be engaged in barter than service
sector firms and in both cases, it is large firms that are more heavily involved. It is clear
that in Russia, barter is much more prevalent in agriculture than in the rest of the
economy. Small enterprises in Russian agriculture are just as likely to be involved in
barter as large ones.6
Table 2 shows that there are wide differences between the other CIS countries in
the size and sectoral patterns of barter and non-monetary transactions, as well as in their
prevalence. In Kazakhstan and Moldova there appears to a lot of barter in agriculture –
but this is not true of Uzbekistan, where barter seems to be disproportionately found in
the services sector. There is also no uniform finding of a higher prevalence of barter in
large than in small firms. Amongst the more advanced reformers in Central and Eastern
Europe including the Baltics, large firms in industry are more involved in barter but there
do not appear to be size effects for services firms.
The patterns in the group of CIS countries look too disparate for the analysis of
the pooled results to be very meaningful. We therefore omit the other CIS countries from
the more detailed examination of the correlates of barter, and we concentrate henceforth
on Russia and Ukraine. For similar reasons, we limit our analysis of the non-CIS
countries to the more advanced CEE reformers, excluding Croatia and Slovenia because
of doubts about data comparability (see above).7
Table 2. Prevalence of barter and non-monetary transactions: firm size and sectoral effects
This table shows the predicted probability that barter accounts for more than 25% of sales of a small firm
(with 50 employees) or a large firm (with 500 employees). In countries in which too few agricultural
enterprises were included in the survey, results are shown for industry and services only. The predicted
probabilities are calculated from an ordered logit regression for each country in which the regressors are the
log of employment, sector dummies and interactive terms in size and sector.
Country Size of
firm
Industry Services Agriculture Percentage of firms reporting
>25% sales as barter and
non-monetary transactions
Russia small 15.6 10.6 51.4
large 22.9 13.1 53.3
35.7
Ukraine small 18.7 7.9
large 27.1 10.6
34.0
Other CIS
Armenia small 2.9 1.7
large 3.8 0.6
2.4
Azerbaijan small 0 0.1
large 0.2 0.3
1.6
Belarus small 5.5 13.2 5.1
large 7.7 11.5 7.1
15.2
Georgia small 8.5 0.9
large 7.4 1.2
4.7
Kazakhstan small 10.5 4.2 59.5
large 16.3 7.9 57.1
14.5
Kyrghistan small 28.2 4.1 12.8
large 27.2 4.6 17.9
23.2
Moldova small 9.6 8.1 68.6
large 17.4 12.4 68.6
44.0
Uzbekistan small 9.1 25.2 13.6
large 10.6 19.5 6.2
66.0
CEE+Baltics (excl. Croatia & Slovenia)
Czech Rep. small 0.8 2.0
large 1.2 2.1
3.0
Estonia small 3.0 2.0
large 2.9 1.9
2.3
Hungary small 0 0
large 0 0
0
Lithuania small 0.1 2.9
large 0.2 1.8
2.7
Poland small 1.4 0.3 0.2
large 2.4 0.5 0.2
4.5
Slovakia small 10.1 17.0
large 17.8 16.6
22.5
In addition to the size of firm and the sector, we also check for any association
between location and tendency to barter. The barter variable is regressed on two location
dummies, “big city” and “town”, (small city is the omitted category). The size, sector and
size-sector interaction terms are included as controls. For Russia, the location dummies
are highly significant – barter is much more prevalent in the more rural locations. For
example, in a firm in a town (the most rural location), barter as a share of sales is8
estimated to be 11 percentage points higher than in a small city. In turn, barter in a big
city is estimated to be 6 percentage points lower than in a small city (see Table 3). This is
consistent with the idea that barter and non-monetary transacting in Russia may be in part
a product of limited trading networks, or “informational islands” (Seabright, 1999).
The sample size for Ukraine is substantially smaller than that for Russia (205 as
compared with 524). This will tend to pull down the significance levels of the coefficients
in the Ukraine regressions. Even keeping this in mind, the clear location effects
characteristic of Russia do not seem to be present in Ukraine. The signs on both big city
and town are positive, and the coefficients insignificant. Location also does not appear to
play a part in barter in the advanced reform countries.
Table 3. Location effects on barter and non-monetary transactions
The table reports the coefficients on the location dummies (the omitted category is “small city”) in an
interval regression with the percentage share of barter in sales as the dependent variable (see text).
Coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of location in percentage points on the share of barter in sales.
Size, sector and size-sector interaction variables are included in all regressions. The standard error is shown
in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * indicates significance at 10%, ** at 5% and
*** at 1%
Location effects Russia Ukraine CEE excl. Croatia &
Slovenia
big city -6.39 (2.54) ** .21 (4.42) -1.02 (1.23)
Town 10.88 (3.47) *** 4.68 (3.97) .10 (1.11)
Number of firms 524 205 840
2.3 The causes of barter and non-monetary transactions
The next step is to analyse in turn a series of possible correlates of barter and non-
monetary transactions. For example, do state firms do more or less barter than new
private firms; is barter more prevalent where the product market is less competitive; is
barter higher in firms reporting financing problems? In the regression analysis, we control
for size, sector - and in Russia, also for location - and allow for country fixed effects
within the Central European region. The omitted ownership category is privatised firms
that are not insider-owned. In Russia and Ukraine, new entrants make less use of barter
than do other firms. There is a clear tendency for state-owned firms in the CEE region to
do less barter – there is no sign of this in Russia and the effect in Ukraine although large
and positive is not significant. There is no indication that insider versus outsider
ownership of privatised firms makes any difference to involvement in barter.
It might have been expected that a foreign ownership stake would make
involvement in barter less likely by providing access to the parent company’s suppliers
elsewhere. However this effect is only found in Ukraine – the presence of a foreign
owner reduces the share of barter in sales by just under one-fifth. In neither Russia nor
Ukraine, nor in the CEE group, was there a correlation between engagement in exporting
and the presence of barter.9
Table 4. Ownership and exporting effects on barter and non-monetary transactions
The regression results for three regressions for each region are reported. The first part of the table reports
the coefficients on the ownership dummies (the omitted category is “privatised but not insider-owned”).
The second part reports the coefficients on the dummy variable for whether or not the firm has a foreign
owner. The third part reports the coefficients on a dummy variable for whether the firm exports or not.
Interval regression with the percentage share of barter in sales as the dependent variable is used in all cases
(see text). Size, sector and size-sector interaction variables are included in all regressions. For Russia,
location dummies are also included. The standard error is shown in parentheses. Significance levels are
indicated as follows: * indicates significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%
Ownership effects Russia Ukraine CEE excl. Croatia &
Slovenia
(1)Ownership type
insider ownership 4.36 (3.16) -5.29 (5.99) -2.59 (2.54)
State 1.01 (5.29) -10.70 (7.28) -5.64 (1.58) ***
ab initio private firm -7.28 (2.87) ** -10.37 (5.77) * .03 (1.29)
(2) Foreign stake .96 (8.11) -18.86 (8.89) ** -.59 (1.58)
(3) Export -.14 (.10) .10 (.11) .03 (.02)
Number of firms 524 205 840
There is a strong relationship between perceived financing problems and the role
of barter in the firm. This is clearly true in Russia and CEE, and true for some measures
though not all in Ukraine. Managers were asked to give a score to the seriousness of
financing problems in general, problems of access to long term bank credit and
difficulties caused by high interest rates. In each region, there is a very strong positive
correlation between the seriousness with which financing problems are rated by managers
and their involvement in barter. When asked specifically about problems with accessing
long term bank credit, managers’ ratings again showed a strong correlation with barter
except in Ukraine. High interest rates seem to capture a feature of financing problems
relevant to barter although the effect is not significant in Ukraine (see Table 5).10
Table 5. Financing problems and barter and non-monetary transactions
Each row in the table reports the results from a separate regression for each region. Interval regression with
the percentage share of barter in sales as the dependent variable is used in each case (see text). The scaling
of the independent variable measuring financing problems runs from 1 to 4, with the exception of “frozen
bank accounts” and “tax offsets”, which are 1/0 dummies. Size, sector and size-sector interaction variables
are included in all regressions. For Russia, location dummies are also included. The standard error is shown
in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * indicates significance at 10%, ** at 5% and
*** at 1%
Financing problems Russia Ukraine CEE excl. Croatia &
Slovenia
Financing problems in
general
4.66 (1.12) *** 5.14 (1.97) *** .78 (.43) *
Access to long term
bank credit
1.91 (.93) ** -.51 (1.53) 1.94 (.41) ***
High interest rates 3.17 (1.10) *** 2.63 (1.93) 1.51 (.45) ***
Payments overdue to
suppliers
7.08 (1.03) *** 6.86 (1.64) *** 1.27 (.46) ***
Receivables overdue
from customers
5.17 (1.03) *** 5.79 (1.59) *** 2.16 (.45) ***
Tax arrears 8.00 (.99) *** 8.11 (1.67) *** 1.84 (.52) ***
Frozen bank accounts 12.90 (2.67) *** 13.18 (4.88) *** N/A
Tax offsets 12.79 (2.51) *** 21.94 (4.54) *** N/A
Given the findings for the correlation between barter and financing problems, it is
not surprising that there is a strong correlation in all three regions between managers’
reports of the extent of barter and both payments overdue to suppliers and overdue
receivables from customers (see Table 5).
The usefulness of barter and non-monetary transactions as devices to avoid
taxation has been much discussed in the literature. In the survey, firms were asked about
their overdue tax payments and there was a strong positive correlation between this
measure and barter in all regions.
When the EBRD survey was implemented in Russia and Ukraine two specific
questions were asked concerning tax arrears. Managers were asked to respond to the
following: (i) “Did your firm have your primary bank account blocked for non-payment
of taxes at any time in 1998?” and (ii) “The Federal, oblast and municipal governments
sometimes pay for their purchases from enterprises by reducing the tax liabilities of the
selling firm. During 1998, did your firm receive such a tax offset from any level of
government?” As is clear from Table 5, there is a very large and significant connection.
Barter and non-monetary transactions go together with the presence of frozen bank
accounts and of tax offsets arising out of non-payment of taxes.11
Table 6. Product market competition and barter and non-monetary transactions
The results of two regressions for each region are shown. Interval regression with the percentage share of
barter in sales as the dependent variable is used in each case (see text). The omitted category in the first
regression is ‘no competitors’ and in the second regression, ‘many customers would switch to our
competitors’. Size, sector and size-sector interaction variables are included in all regressions. For Russia,
location dummies are also included. The standard error is shown in parentheses. Significance levels are
indicated as follows: * indicates significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%
Product Market
Competition
Russia Ukraine CEE excl. Croatia &
Slovenia
(1) No. of competitors:
one to three -10.12 (5.28)* -.64 (7.55) 1.76 (2.07)
more than three -9.85 (4.39)** -2.67 (5.92) 4.98 (1.67)***
(2) Response to 10%
increase in own price
demand lower .82 (2.91) -4.97 (4.48) -.65 (1.22)
demand slightly lower -.051 (2.91) -2.35 (4.16) -2.42 (1.15) **
no change in demand -2.32 (3.47) -1.72 (6.71) -1.98 (1.42)
The questionnaire used two approaches to eliciting information about market
power. Managers were asked whether the firm faces no competitors, one to three or more
than three competitors in the market for its main product. They were also asked to predict
what would happen to demand for their main product if they raised their price by 10%
(relative to inflation and to the prices of their competitors).
The correlation between each of these measures and the extent of barter and non-
monetary transactions is reported in Table 6. There is no uniform pattern across the three
regions when the relationship between competition and barter is examined. In Ukraine,
there seems to be no particular link between competition in the product market and barter.
We therefore concentrate on Russia on the one hand, and the CEE countries on the other.
In Russia, firms facing competitors in the product market were engaged in less barter than
were monopolists. The indicators of monopoly power from the 10% price test were not
significant.
But in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, competition and barter are
related in the opposite way: firms with more than three competitors report more barter
and non-monetary transactions than do monopolists. There is some support for this kind
of effect from the second regression – i.e. using the 10% price test. Compared with the
omitted category in which customers switch to alternative suppliers if the firm puts its
price up by 10%, it seems that firms with market power do less barter.
The top panel of table 7 brings together the correlates of barter and non-monetary
transactions into one regression. One variable is used to reflect financing constraints
(arrears to suppliers) and the number of competitors is used to reflect competitive
conditions. The sample sizes are somewhat smaller here because we want to compare this
baseline regression with a regression that includes lagged barter. It seems that whilst
there are a number of common features of firms engaged in barter across the three regions
(size, financing problems and arrears, including tax arrears), there are also important12
differences. In Russia, barter is a rural phenomenon but there is no locational aspect in
Ukraine or the CEE. In Ukraine, product market competition and barter are not related
whereas there are effects going in opposite directions in Russia as compared with the
CEE. Ownership effects are also quite different across region.
A fairly similar picture emerges when the change in barter over the past three
years is investigated. In all three regions, the presence of liquidity problems is strongly
correlated with the growth of barter. In Ukraine, there was a sharp increase in the use of
barter in outsider-owned privatised firms that is reflected in the highly significant and
large negative coefficients on the other ownership types.
Table 7. Correlates of barter and of the change in the use of barter
The results of two regressions for each region are shown. Interval regression with the percentage share of
barter in sales as the dependent variable is used in each case (see text). In (1), the right hand side variables
are a measure of financing problems (arrears to suppliers), product market competition (number of
competitors) and ownership dummies. In (2), the level of barter three years ago and a performance measure
(sales growth) are added. Size, sector and size-sector interaction variables are included in all regressions.
For Russia, location dummies are also included. The standard error is shown in parentheses. Significance
levels are indicated as follows: * indicates significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. ns mean not
significant at the 10% level.
Russia Ukraine CEE excl. Croatia &
Slovenia